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# Message Text

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44
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SAM-01 IO-14 SSO-00 NSCE-00

CCO-00 NEA-14 SAJ-01 OMB-01 CIEP-03 ACDA-19 SY-04

OPR-02 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 EB-11

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P R 241240Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9051
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION NATO
USEUCOM
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
DIA WASHDC//DI-5//

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1717

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY TU GR
SUBJECT: TURKISH INTENTIONS, GREEK REACTIONS AND U.S. POLICY

REF: NICOSIA 1663, 1659

SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE ANKARA'S PRINCIPAL GOAL IS TO HOLD ITS SEAPORT AND MUCH OF ITS ACQUIRED TERRITORY. WE BELIEVE GREEKS CAN LEARN TO LIVE WITH THIS IF NO EFFORT IS MADE TO FORMALIZE THEIR LOSS, AND THAT PROSPECT IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF INCONCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT TERRITORIAL ISSUES AND A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT. THIS IS NOT A VERY NEAT SOLUTION, BUT MAY BE LEAST UNDESIRABLE OF UNDESIRABLE OPTIONS. WE THINK USG CAN LIVE WITH IT. END SUMMARY

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1. WE BELIEVE IT USEFUL TO PULL TOGETHER OUR BEST GUESSES AS TO IMMEDIATE POLITICAL VISTA IN CYPRUS.

2. TURKISH INTENTIONS. FROM BEGINNING, TURKS HAVE INSISTED THAT THEIR INTENTIONS ARE LIMITED AND THEY SOUGHT RESTORATION PRE-1963 "CONSTITUTIONALITY." PRAGMATICALLY WE THINK THEIR KUP OBJECTIVE IS ACCESS TO THE SEA FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS. LACK OF ACCESS HAS BEEN A LONGSTANDING AND RISING SOURCE OF FRUSTRATION TO THEM. IT HAS CAUSED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND HAS HAMPERED THEIR EFFORTS TO MOVE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS TO AND FROM ISLAND. WE THINK THIS REQUIREMENT IS THEIR MINIMUM AND THAT THEY WILL GO TO ALMOST ANY LENGTHS TO SATISFY IT. (REFTEL B DESCRIBES AREA THEY WANT.) THEY WILL PROBABLY FORCE GREEKS OUT OF THEIR AREAS AND REPLACE THEM WITH TURK CYPRIOTS FROM ELSEWHERE ON ISLAND.

3. WE ASSUME TURKISH INTENTIONS ARE IN FACT LIMITED. RELATIVELY SMALL SCALE OF ATTACK CONFIRMS THIS ASSUMPTION. WE ASSUME ALSO THAT CONCERN AS TO USG AND SOVIET REACTIONS PERSUADED TURKS TO SETTLE FOR LIMITED OBJECTIVE RATHER THAN LAUNCHING MAJOR ATTACK TO SECURE ISLAND. SIMILARLY, WE THINK UNCHARACTERISTIC TURKISH SOLICITUDE FOR MAKARIOS PARTICULARLY IN FIRST DAYS WAS EFFORT TO CONVINCE SOVIETS THAT TURKISH OBJECTIVES WERE COMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET INTERESTS.

4. WE THINK THAT TURKISH INSISTENCE UPON RESTORATION OF "CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE" IS TACTICAL. FIRST, IT PROVIDES EXCUSE FOR THEM TO EXERCISE UNILATERAL INTERVENTION RIGHTS UNDER 1960 CONSTITUTION. SECOND, IN COMING MONTHS IT WILL JUSTIFY THEIR REFUSAL TO MOVE OUT OF AREAS OCCUPIED, AS THEY NEGOTIATE OSTENSIBLY TOWARD RESTORATION OF "PARTNER-SHIP STATUS" AS TURKS CONTINUE TO DEFINE 1960 CONSTITUTIONAL SET UP. WE DOUBT TURKS WOULD SETTLE FOR 1960 CONSTITUTION IF IT WAS OFFERED TO THEM TODAY, ARGUING THAT ONLY GEOGRAPHICAL SEPARATION AND ACCESS TO SEA PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR TURKISH COMMUNITY'S "PARTNER-SHIP" RIGHTS.

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE TURKS WILL GO FOR FORMAL PARTITION, SINCE IT UNDERMINES THEIR RATIONALE AND COULD CAUSE SERIOUS TROUBLES WITHGREEK CYPRIOTS AND ANGER SOVIETS. THEY MAY WELL RESURFACE "FEDERALISM" FORMULA, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY



THEY WILL NOT SETTLE FOR ANY PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE LARGE MEASURE OF TURKISH AUTONOMY UNDER UMBRELLA OF SOME WEAK CENTRAL GOVT. (I.E., CONFEDERATION). IF IT IS CHARGED THAT WHAT THEY DEMAND IS DE FACTO PARTITION, THEY CAN RETORY (INFORMALLY): "THE GREEKS IMPOSED DE FACTO ENOSIS ON THEIR PORTION. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT OF US?"

6. GREEK REACTIONS. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR ANY

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GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION TO GIVE FORMAL ASSENT TO TURKISH
LAND GRAB. WE THINK BEST WE CAN EXPECT IS THERE NOW WILL BE
TWO SUBJECTS TO TALK ABOUT, EITHER SERIATIM OR IN TANDEM:
RESTORATION OF TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO ANTE; AND FUTURE CON-
STITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. IF WE SEEM TO BE PROMISING CON-
TINUATION OF LONGSTANDING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, WITH NEW COMPLI-
CATIONS ADDED, I WOULD SUGGEST THIS IS ABOUT THE BEST WE ARE
LIKELY TO GET FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE. AT LEAST THEY WILL HAVE
ENOUGH TO TALK ABOUT TO KEEP THE TALKS GOING.

7. WE CAN HARDLY MAKE MUCH OF A GUESS AS TO ATHENS' INTEN-
TIONS FROM HERE AND IN LIGHT OF RECENT CHANGE IN ATHENS.
WE WOULD IMAGINE, HOWEVER, THAT WITH IOANNIDES' ADVENTURE
AND ITS CATASTROPHIC RESULTS IN MIND AND WITH PROSPECT OF
BETTER RELATIONS WITH NICOSIA, ATHENS WILL BE CONTENT TO GO
ALONG WITH SCENARIO IN PARA 6.

8. U.S. POLICY INTERESTS. I HAVE DESCRIBED OUR VIEWS AS TO
USG POLICY TOWARD CLERIDES (REF A). BEYOND THAT,
I BELIEVE WE CAN LIVE WITH INCONCLUSIVE SITUATION DESCRIBED
ABOVE. THERE MAY BE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES IF TURKS RETAIN THEIR
ACCESS TO THE SEA. THEIR EARLIER FRUSTRATION HAD BEEN MOUNT-
ING TOWARD AN EXPLOSION. THE ANTICIPATED SEPARATION OF
POPULATIONS WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS IMMEDIATE DISLOCATIONS AND
WILL FURTHER EXACERBATE INTERCOMMUNAL RELATIONS. THIS IS
REGRETTABLE. HOWEVER, PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF COMMUNITIES
COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO REDUCTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL FRICTION
EVEN IF IT DIMS ANY HOPES FOR A UNITED CYPRUS. GREEK CYPRIOTS
HAVE ATHENS TO BLAME FOR THEIR LOSSES. WE DOUBT THEIR ANGER
IS LIKELY TO RISE TO POINT WHERE NICOSIA WOULD RISK WAR TO
REGAIN THEM, PARTICULARLY SO LONG AS LOSSES ARE NOT
FORMALIZED.

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9. THE
CYPRUS PROBLEM" HAS BEEN SUI GENERIS FOR A LONG TIME
AND SEEMS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. IF WE CAN GET AN EARLY END TO
FIGHTING AND STABILIZE TURK LINES, RECENT CHANGES WILL NOT
NECESSARILY MAKE CYPRUS SITUATION MORE EXPLOSIVE. TWO COMMUNITIES'
FIRSTHAND VIEW OF REAL WAR (AS DISTINCT FROM INTERCOMMUNAL
SNIPING) MAY MAKE POST-CRISIS CYPRUS LESS EXPLOSIVE THAN IT WAS.
DAVIES

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